INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of digital platforms and data-driven technologies has fundamentally altered the relationship between individuals and their personal information. In an increasingly interconnected society, telephone numbers, contact details and other identifying information are routinely collected, stored, processed and disclosed through digital applications. The implications extend beyond registered users to individuals who may never have subscribed to, or expressly consented to the use of, such services.
These developments raise important questions concerning the scope of the constitutional right to privacy, the lawful processing of personal data and the extent to which an individual may authorise the disclosure or processing of another person’s information. A particularly significant one is whether the consent of a registered user can provide a sufficient legal basis for processing the personal data of a non-user whose contact details appear in the user’s address book.
These questions came before the High Court of Lagos State, Eti-Osa Judicial Division, in Incorporated Trustees of Data Privacy Lawyers Association & Ors v. Truecaller International LLP, Suit No. LD/2021MFHR/2025, decided on the 14th of September 2026. This article examines the decision’s implications for constitutional privacy, consent, lawful processing and accountability under Nigerian data protection law, while considering the significance of the Court’s ultimate determination.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The Applicants commenced the proceedings by an originating motion dated the 13th day of August, 2025. The Applicants alleged that the Respondent, through its Truecaller application, harvested, collected, stored, disclosed or otherwise processed telephone numbers belonging to individuals who had not registered with the application. Their case was that the processing occurred without their consent and without a sufficient lawful basis under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023. The Second Applicant stated that she had discovered that her telephone number was associated with the application despite not having registered with it. The Applicants further maintained that the processing of non-users’ information implicated their constitutional right to privacy and exposed affected individuals to unsolicited communications, intrusion, loss of control over personal information and other potential privacy harms.
The Respondent disputed the allegations and maintained that the application did not automatically harvest or upload contact lists from users’ devices. According to the Respondent, the transfer of contact information occurred through an optional enhanced search feature, which required a separate voluntary action by the user and representations that the user was authorised to share the information and that the necessary consent had been obtained. The Respondent further contended that its caller-identification and spam-detection functions served legitimate public-safety objectives. It also challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the competence of the representative action and the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the Applicants. The Applicants sought, among other reliefs, declarations that the processing of their telephone numbers violated Section 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), and the NDPA 2023, prohibitory and mandatory injunctions, deletion of the relevant personal data, the sum of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira), in general damages and N100,000,000 (One Hundred Million Naira) in exemplary damages.
In its judgment, the Court addressed the relationship between constitutional privacy and personal data protection, the adequacy of the consent relied upon by the Respondent, the justification advanced in support of the processing and the evidence required to establish an infringement.
Although the Court rejected the proposition that a registered user’s consent automatically constituted consent on behalf of a non-user, it ultimately dismissed the application for failure to establish the alleged infringement by cogent and credible evidence.
SECTION 37 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Section 37 of the CFRN provides: “The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.”
Although the provision expressly identifies homes, correspondence and communications, its opening reference to the privacy of citizens raises a broader question concerning the extent of the constitutional protection afforded to personal information in contemporary digital environments. The Respondent argued that Section 37 does not necessarily extend to a bare telephone number. The Applicants, on the other hand, maintained that a telephone number constitutes personal data and falls within the protection of constitutional privacy. In resolving the issue, the Court relied on existing judicial authorities, including Nwali v. EBSIEC & Ors, Emerging Markets Telecommunications Services Ltd v. Eneye and Incorporated Trustees of Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative & Anor v. NIMC. The Court affirmed that the constitutional guarantee encompasses the protection of personal information, personal communication and personal data.
This decision is significant because it recognises that privacy in the digital age cannot be confined to the secrecy of communications or the physical boundaries of an individual’s home. Information capable of identifying an individual may also implicate a constitutionally protected privacy interest. A telephone number may appear to be an ordinary identifier. However, when associated with a name, photograph, social media account or other identifying information, it may facilitate the identification, tracking or unsolicited contact of the individual concerned. The fact that information may be known to another person does not necessarily extinguish every privacy interest associated with its subsequent collection, retention, disclosure or use.
Nevertheless, the existence of a protected privacy interest must be distinguished from the question whether a particular act of processing constitutes an infringement. The constitutional character of personal information does not automatically render every instance of its collection or use unlawful. The nature of the information, the circumstances of its acquisition, the purpose of the processing and the applicable legal justification remain relevant. The Court recognised the relevance of constitutional privacy to digital processing without eliminating the need for a fact-specific assessment of the alleged violation.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 37 AND THE NIGERIA DATA PROTECTION ACT
The constitutional guarantee of privacy operates alongside the statutory framework established by the NDPA. While Section 37 provides the constitutional foundation for the protection of privacy, the NDPA establishes obligations and conditions governing the processing of personal data. Section 25(1) of the NDPA identifies lawful bases for processing personal data. These include consent, the performance of a contract, compliance with a legal obligation, the protection of vital interests, the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority, and legitimate interests pursued by a data controller, data processor or third party, subject to the applicable statutory conditions.
The availability of multiple lawful bases is important. Consent is not the only possible justification for processing personal data under the NDPA. However, where an organisation relies on a basis other than consent, it must establish that the relevant requirements are satisfied. The mere existence of a legitimate commercial objective or a useful digital service does not, without more, establish the lawfulness of every processing activity undertaken in connection with that service.
In the Truecaller proceedings, public safety featured prominently in the Respondent’s justification. The Respondent maintained that caller identification and spam detection assist users in identifying suspicious calls and protecting themselves against fraud and harassment. Section 45(1) of the Constitution was also relevant to the arguments concerning permissible limitations on fundamental rights in the interest of public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Court accepted that Section 45(1) gives constitutional validity to laws that derogate from the right, but held that it does not give data controllers and processors a free hand to process personal data without a lawful basis.S
The constitutional provision, however, should not be understood as granting an unrestricted licence to process personal data. Any reliance on a limitation of the right to privacy must be considered within the applicable constitutional and statutory framework. Equally, the existence of a lawful basis under the NDPA does not dispense with the need to comply with the other requirements governing the processing of personal data. The proper inquiry is therefore not simply whether a platform performs a socially beneficial function. It is whether the particular processing activity is supported by an applicable lawful basis and satisfies the relevant legal requirements, having regard to its purpose, necessity, proportionality and effect on the rights of the individuals concerned. This distinction is especially important for digital platforms whose operations may involve information relating to persons who have never directly engaged with the service.
CONSENT AND THE PERSONAL DATA OF NON-USER
One of the most important issues in the proceedings concerned the Respondent’s reliance on consent obtained from users who activated the enhanced search feature. The Respondent maintained that users who uploaded contact information represented that they were authorised to share the information and that the individuals concerned had consented. It contended that the users were responsible for determining the purposes and means of the processing and that the Respondent acted as a processor in receiving and handling the information. The Applicant argued that the persons whose telephone numbers were processed were the relevant data subjects and that the Respondent could not attribute the consent of its registered users to non-users who had not independently authorised the processing.
The Court considered the definition of consent under Section 65 of the NDPA and rejected the proposition that a Truecaller user’s consent automatically constituted consent on behalf of a non-user whose contact details appeared in the user’s address book. This aspect of the decision underscores an important distinction between possession of personal data and legal authority to determine how that data may be processed. An individual may legitimately possess another person’s telephone number for personal communication. That possession does not, by itself, establish authority to authorise its collection, retention, disclosure or use by a separate digital platform.
The distinction is also relevant to Section 26(1) of the NDPA, which places the burden of demonstrating that consent has been obtained on the data controller where consent is relied upon as the lawful basis for processing. A representation by a registered user that the user is authorised to share contact information is not necessarily equivalent to proof that the affected non-user gave valid consent or that the registered user had the requisite authority to act on that individual’s behalf. Accordingly, digital platforms that rely on contact-upload features must carefully distinguish between the permission granted by the person operating the application and the legal basis required for processing information relating to third parties.
The decision should not, however, be interpreted as establishing that every instance of third-party data processing is unlawful in the absence of consent. The NDPA recognises other lawful bases for processing. The critical question is whether the organisation can establish an applicable lawful basis for the particular processing activity and comply with the conditions governing its use. The rejection of automatic implied consent is therefore a significant clarification, but it does not eliminate the need to assess other lawful bases independently.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Incorporated Trustees of Data Privacy Lawyers Association & Ors v. Truecaller International LLP provides an important contribution to the interpretation of the constitutional right to privacy in Nigeria’s digital environment.
By affirming that the privacy of citizens under Section 37 of the Constitution includes the protection of personal information and personal data, the High Court of Lagos State recognised the continuing relevance of constitutional privacy to contemporary forms of digital processing. Its rejection of the proposition that a registered user’s consent automatically constitutes the consent of non-users whose contact details appear in the user’s address book also highlights the need for lawful authority when processing third-party personal information. At the same time, the dismissal of the application underscores that a protected right does not itself establish an infringement. A claimant must prove the facts that justify the relief sought, and the questions the decision leaves open will shape how future cases are pleaded and argued.
